According to Scrotivius:
"Scipio, being close to the front lines assessed the situation and it did not look good. His troops were exhausted and the enemy were about to launch the killer blow. But, it was late in the day and the bulk of the enemy were the wrong side of the river. For some reason the enemy tarried in the execution of there duty and Scipio's army was spared".
The positions at the end of turn 4.
In fact, turn 4 had ended on an early double initiative roll. The Romans still had morale chips and had moved away from the river. If another double ended turn 5 (the last turn) before the last Roman chips could be taken, then the Roman army, being the defender, would be able to claim a victory and the Carthaginians and would be forced to retreat and they would surely lose Baetica. If the turn lasted, the Carthaginian would, for sure, get a clean victory.
In campaign turns, Baetica is important. It provides 25% of Carthaginian reinforcements at the start of each campaign turn. Consequently, it was the Carthaginian nerve that broke. The Romans were offered the following result:
Both sides to roll on the '10' column of the attrition table for battle casualties. The Romans to withdraw from the field, rolling on the retreat table with a -2 die modifier (equivalent to a loss by 'probe').
Peter, worried about the possible complete loss of the army, agreed to the terms. As it was, both sides rolled a 1 for attrition and lost 1 CU each. The Romans then rolled a 6 for their retreat and lost another 3. Rome lost political control of three spaces.
The campaign map after Hispilis.
Peter and I used the remainder of the evening to play out the campaign turn. I intend to post the report tomorrow.